An Atomic Sound by Weltsek, Erich William
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Major Qualifying Projects (All Years) Major Qualifying Projects
April 2016
An Atomic Sound
Erich William Weltsek
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/mqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Major Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Major Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Weltsek, E. W. (2016). An Atomic Sound. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/mqp-all/3524
   
AN ATOMIC SOUND 
Nuclear Energy on the Long Island Sound 
Erich Weltsek 
      
 
1 
 
Contents 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
Preface .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 
A Fragment of What Was .......................................................................................................................... 3 
A Product of Post-War America ................................................................................................................... 4 
Nuclear Concern........................................................................................................................................ 4 
The Future of Energy ................................................................................................................................. 4 
Nuclear Energy on the Sound, Pre-1979 ...................................................................................................... 6 
Shoreham – The Announcement .............................................................................................................. 6 
Shoreham’s Early Opposition and Construction Permit Hearings (1967-1973) ....................................... 8 
Further Complications at Shoreham ....................................................................................................... 12 
Millstone 1965-1979 ............................................................................................................................... 14 
Three Mile Island - 1979 ............................................................................................................................. 17 
Fear of “China Syndrome” ...................................................................................................................... 17 
Post Three Mile Island ................................................................................................................................ 20 
Shoreham (1979-1982) ........................................................................................................................... 20 
Millstone (1979-1986)............................................................................................................................. 22 
The Plants Today ........................................................................................................................................ 25 
Final Fate of Shoreham (1983-1994) ...................................................................................................... 25 
Millstone (1986-Present) ........................................................................................................................ 29 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 31 
The Future of Nuclear Energy? ............................................................................................................... 31 
What is Sustainability? ........................................................................................................................... 31 
Sustainability and Nuclear Energy .......................................................................................................... 32 
The Positives ....................................................................................................................................... 32 
The Negatives ...................................................................................................................................... 34 
Closing Words ......................................................................................................................................... 36 
Bibliography................................................................................................................................................ 37 
 
  
 
2 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Professor Constance Clark for the hours of 
insightful discussion (both on and off topic) in our weekly meetings, and for the constant 
reminders to refrain from using the passive voice in my writing. The habit has been a hard one to 
break, and I am still working on it. 
Besides my advisor, I would also like to thank to professors Robert Krueger and Jeffrey 
Forgeng for their helpful comments and suggestions relating to the project, and for being two of 
the most influential professors I have had during my time at WPI.  
I would also like to thank Collections Assessment & Development Librarian Karen 
Bohrer for providing access to the Hartford Courant and Newsday newspapers. Without your 
help, this paper could not have happened.  
A quick thanks to Peter Fountaine at the Town of Brookhaven for answering (any 
questions I may have had relating to Shoreham, and for the enriching discussions we had on the 
topic during my internship with the town.  
Lastly, I would like to thank my fiancée Selena Hayter, my parents Bernadette and 
Lawrence Weltsek, and my brother Steven Weltsek for their unending support throughout this 
project and my time away at college. I cannot put into words my gratitude. 
  
 
3 
 
Preface 
A Fragment of What Was 
 
Lurking behind 
a locked chain-link 
fence stands the 
seafoam green structure 
of the Shoreham 
nuclear power plant—
tucked away on the 
North Shore of Long 
Island, hardly visible 
from North Country 
Road which passes alongside the plant. The iconic pill-bottle shaped structure of the Shoreham 
plant stands in silence. The silence of the Shoreham plant was the result of a nearly three decade 
long drama. Across the Long Island Sound another, totally different story unfolded. The 
Millstone Station plant is located in Waterford, Connecticut. The plant’s stout and sprawling 
structures are clearly visible to Waterford residents and visitors. Millstone at its peak was 
operating three reactors on site, but is currently generating electricity with two nuclear reactors.  
Both Shoreham and Millstone were products of the 1960s. Both plants experienced the 
aftermath of Three Mile Island. And yet both plants followed different paths: one was eventually 
decommissioned, and the other continued to operate and expand. Why did these plants have such 
vastly different outcomes even though they are separated by less than 50 miles? Environmental, 
socio-political and economic factors influenced the outcomes of Shoreham and Millstone. It was 
Figure 1: The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant  
(Photo Credit: Steven J. Weltsek, Shoreham, March 8, 2016) 
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not simply one of these three factors that led to the relative success of Millstone, but a 
conglomeration of the three. Conversely, these same three factors spelled out the doom of the 
Shoreham nuclear power plant. 
A Product of Post-War America 
Nuclear Concern 
 
The world first learned about the power of nuclear technology in 1945. The technology was 
harnessed into two war-ending weapons. With World War II’s end, the Cold War began as 
tensions between the United States and USSR grew. With the Cold War came fear of nuclear 
war, and global mass destruction. Citizens of the United States were advised how to “save” 
themselves from nuclear blasts by digging bomb shelters in their yards, or by hiding under desks 
at school.  After being introduced like that, it is no surprise that nuclear energy concerned many 
people. One side of nuclear energy was the promise of clean, cheap and abundant energy. On the 
other side was a horrible, destructive weapon capable of flattening entire cities.1 American 
citizens’ hesitance and concern towards nuclear energy stemmed from the explosive unveiling of 
the power of nuclear technology. 
The Future of Energy 
 
Technological advancements and innovation following World War II gave birth to, and drove 
the nuclear industry. 1946 saw the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) by 
Congress, which created a “program for Government control of the production, ownership, and 
                                                          
1 James Mahaffey, Atomic Awakening: A New Look at the History and Future of Nuclear Power (Cambridge: 
Pegasus, 2010) pg. XIV-XV. 
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use of fissionable material.”2 The AEC would set regulations, create policies, and hold hearings 
relating to nuclear technology, be it for a university’s scientific study or a private utility’s 
commercial energy production. Building on the government’s authority over nuclear technology, 
in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched his Atoms for Peace initiative, calling for the 
growth of peaceful, non-military use of nuclear technology in the wake of World War II.3 
Ironically, the first nuclear powered submarine, the USS Nautilus, was launched in 1954, a year 
after Atoms for Peace was announced.4 As nuclear technology improved, the United States 
government took steps towards the spread of commercial nuclear energy in the country. In 1958, 
the United States (through the AEC) commissioned the first commercial nuclear power plant on 
American soil, the Shippingport Atomic Power Station in Pennsylvania. The AEC and the 
federal government saw Shippingport as a way to convince the public that nuclear technologies, 
especially nuclear power were clean and safe and produce energy that was “economically 
attractive.”5 More nuclear plants followed in the 60s and early 70s. By October 1973, the United 
States was in the grips of the first oil crisis.6 As oil prices increased, the search for alternative 
sources of energy also increased. Two choices became apparent to fuel America’s cities: uranium 
or coal. Between 1975 and 1982, use of coal to generate electricity increased by 50 percent as 
oil-burners were converted to coal.7 The risks associated with burning coal were well known, 
stories of “killer smog” and the dangers associated with coal mining had been heard for decades.8 
The immediate risks of nuclear energy were also well known, the dangers of uranium mining, 
                                                          
2 Joan Aron, Licensed to Kill?: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Shoreham Power Plant (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998) pg. 13. 
3 Mahaffey, Atomic Awakening, 228. 
4 Mahaffey, Atomic Awakening, 220. 
5 Mahaffey, Atomic Awakening, 229. 
6 Spencer R. Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012) pg. 196. 
7 Ibid, 197. 
8 Ibid, 198. 
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and concern over radiation leaks and radon gas.9  The argument of “soot or atoms” was 
established during this time - an argument that will be discussed in a later section.    
Long Island had a challenging energy situation: a lack of natural resources. There is no coal 
or oil on Long Island, so all fuel must be transported to the island from the mainland. Pair the 
lack of natural resources with the pollution associated with coal and oil combustion and a 
population that doubled between 1950 and 1960: it is not difficult to see why the electric utility 
on Long Island reached for alternative sources of energy.10 Nuclear power plants appeared to be 
the answer to all of Long Island’s energy issues by avoiding the problem of constant refueling, 
and by being a “clean” source of energy.  
Nuclear Energy on the Sound, Pre-1979 
Shoreham – The Announcement 
 
On April 13th 1966, John J. Tuohy, president of the Long Island Lighting Company 
(LILCO) confirmed that land on Long Island was to be purchased for Long Island’s first nuclear 
power plant. A 450-acre plot of land located in the hamlet of Shoreham within the Town of 
Brookhaven, Suffolk County was purchased from the Steers Sand and Gravel Corporation. 
LILCO announced that the nuclear plant’s initial cost would be between $65-million and $75-
million and construction would begin in 1969 and be completed by 1973.11 The plant at 
Shoreham would produce enough energy to power 450,000 average homes.12  
                                                          
9 Ibid, 199. 
10 Aron, Licensed to Kill?, 12. 
11 “LILCO Buying Nuclear Plant Site in Suffolk,” Newsday, April 13, 1966, pg. 11. 
12 Francis X. Clines, “Utility Planning Nuclear Plant in Suffolk County: Park Is Also Proposed for Part of Shoreham 
Tract,” The New York Times, April 14, 1966, pg. 22. 
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 Initial reception of the announcement of the plant was positive. Joan Aron, a professor of 
political science at New York University and a scholar of the Shoreham nuclear plant, states in 
her book Licensed to Kill?, that Shoreham was “supported by both the public and by state and 
local officials – by everyone, in fact, except for a small band of antinuclear activists.”13 Support 
for the project came instantly from the town and county government. The Town of Brookhaven’s 
Supervisor Charles R. Dominy called the Shoreham plant a “stupendous installation.”14 Dominy 
expressed Brookhaven’s support by declaring “There has been nothing but support here for this 
project … it will be a good clean operation.”15 Dominy in the same press release gave insight to 
why Brookhaven supported the project, “[Shoreham] will add another piece of highly assessed 
property to the town tax rolls.”16 In addition to support from the local Town government, elected 
officials at the County level also voiced their support. Suffolk County Executive H. Lee 
Dennison, supported the project because it would bring “desirable employment” to the county. 
“Desirable employment” took the form of construction jobs to build the plant, and highly skilled 
technician jobs to operate it. Between the income generated by the Town and County from taxes, 
and the creation of jobs in the area, it is clear why elected officials were initially so supportive of 
the Shoreham project. 
 The citizens of Shoreham, much like their local government, initially supported LILCO’s 
nuclear plant. Residents used environmental arguments to justify their support for the new plant. 
In the months following the announcement, citizens spoke at Town Board supporting LILCO’s 
new nuclear plant. Some citizens even went as far as to demand assurance from LILCO that the 
                                                          
13 Aron, Licensed to Kill?, 5. 
14 Francis X. Clines, “Utility Planning Nuclear Plant in Suffolk County: Park Is Also Proposed for Part of Shoreham 
Tract,” The New York Times, April 14, 1966, pg. 22. 
15 “LILCO Buying Nuclear Plant Site in Suffolk,” Newsday, April 13, 1966, pg. 11. 
16 Ibid. 
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plant be nuclear powered rather than oil or coal powered.17 In addition to the concern over air 
pollution, residents of Shoreham stated that would rather have the 450-acres purchased by 
LILCO used for nuclear power generation than the mining operations that were proposed for the 
site. Again, with nuclear came the promise of clean energy, which Long Islanders preferred to 
the dust and noise that came with an active sand and gravel mine.18 In addition to quality of life 
and environmental concerns lending support to the nuclear plant, citizens would also enjoy 
economic benefits from the plant. School taxes were predicted by the vice president of the 
Shoreham Civic Association, Robert Tomlinson Jr., to be cut an “average of $10 or $12 for each 
$100 of assessed valuation” and new job opportunities were to be introduced to the area.19 
Abraham Rabinovich, a writer for Newsday, also suggested that those living in Shoreham and the 
surrounding area had a “relaxed attitude” towards nuclear energy. Rabinovich argues that this 
“relaxed attitude” was because of Shoreham’s proximity (five miles) to Brookhaven National 
Laboratory’s nuclear facilities;20 by 1965, Brookhaven National Laboratory had three research 
reactors in operation. As of 1966, the residents of Shoreham and the surrounding areas showed 
great support for the proposed power plant. By 1967, the luster of Shoreham’s plant would begin 
to fade, as a miscalculation by LILCO resulted in the entire project’s demise. 
Shoreham’s Early Opposition and Construction Permit Hearings (1967-1973) 
 
On October 17th 1967, the news broke to the public that LILCO had plans for a second 
nuclear power plant on Long Island. This second plant was to be built near the affluent village of 
                                                          
17 Abraham Rabinovich, “Prefer Atoms To Coal Soot,” Newsday, June 3, 1966, pg. 15. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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Lloyd Harbor.21 To break the news to the community, the mayor of Lloyd Harbor sent a letter to 
the residents of the village, which assured taxpayers that the plant would provide “massive” tax 
relief, and insisted that the plant would blend into the rustic waterfront aesthetic of the village.22 
The plant at Lloyd Harbor was proposed less than a year after Shoreham’s announcement, before 
LILCO even applied for a construction permit for Shoreham. The bold move by LILCO to 
announce two nuclear power plants in such a short period of time would be the beginning of the 
end of public acceptance of nuclear power on Long Island. 
 After hearing that a nuclear plant was to be placed in their backyard near their prime 
waterfront property, citizens of Lloyd Harbor (the Gold Coast of Suffolk County, as it was also 
known) were “horrified.”23 Shortly after the announcement, the Lloyd Harbor Study Group 
(LHSG) was formed, spearheaded by wealthy partners, Ann and William Carl, who were a 
biologist and an engineer respectively. Over the next year, Mr. and Mrs. Carl rallied support and 
raised money to fight LILCO and their proposed plant. With such opposition at Lloyd Harbor 
from its residents and the LHSG, LILCO abandoned the Lloyd Harbor plant by 1969. Even 
though the plant did not exist and the idea of a plant in Lloyd Harbor was short lived, the 
proposal catalyzed an environmental movement, crusading against nuclear power on Long 
Island.24 After their victory against the Lloyd Harbor plant, LHSG set out against LILCO’s plant 
at Shoreham. Director Emeritus of the Center for History of Physics of the American Institute of 
Physics Spencer Weart makes note that a poll taken in 1965 showed that a “great majority” of 
environmentalists opposed nuclear power “unlike most other Americans.”25  This general pro-
                                                          
21 Francis X. Clines, “Utility Asks to Build Nuclear Plant in L.I. Village: Approval of $150-Million Facility on 
Shore Sought,” The New York Times, October 10, 1967, pg. 31. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Aron, Licensed to Kill?, 16. 
24 Ibid, 17. 
25 Weart, Rise of Nuclear Fear, 194. 
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nuclear mindset amongst Americans would shift in the coming years, in the wake of events like 
Three Mile Island. 
 On May 24th 1968, LILCO filed with the AEC an application for a construction permit 
for Shoreham.26 The AEC permitting process was divided into two parts: a review by AEC staff 
and a public hearing. Generally, public hearings held by the AEC had been uneventful, with 
hearings lasting from a few days to a few weeks.27 By the end of 1968, LILCO had deemed that 
the original plan of 540 megawatts at Shoreham was insufficient to the Island’s needs. LILCO 
concluded that Shoreham’s output would have to be 820 megawatts to meet the Island’s needs. 
This increase in output required the plant’s application for a construction permit to be revised 
and resubmitted, causing a year delay.28 The application to the AEC would be resubmitted in 
May 1969.29 The estimated cost of the plant had jumped from $70 million to $127 million in 
1968 due to “rising labor and construction costs.”30 The estimated cost of the plant ballooned 
again to $217 million due to the increased output, nearly three times the 1966 estimated cost.31 
 The AEC staff deemed Shoreham safe and approved LILCO’s application, moving the 
process along to public hearings.32 On September 21st 1970, the public hearings began.33 The 
Shoreham hearings would become the longest set of hearings in AEC history, dragging on for 
over two years.34 Neither LILCO nor the AEC were prepared for the opposition they were about 
to face from the LHSG and their allies. One group to back LHSG and provide name recognition 
                                                          
26 Aron, Licensed to Kill?, 17. 
27 Ibid, 20. 
28 Ibid, 18. 
29 Ibid, 19. 
30 “Cost of LILCO Atom Plant Almost Doubled in 2 Yrs.” Newsday, May 29, 1968, pg. 9. 
31 Aron, 19. 
32 Christopher Weber, “AEC Expert: Shoreham Plant Safe,” Newsday, February 26, 1970, pg. 4. 
33 Carter B. Horsley, “Hearing to Start on L.I. Atom Plant: A.E.C. Takes Up Shoreham Proposal Tomorrow,” The 
New York Times, September 20, 1970, pg. 26. 
34 Aron, Licensed to Kill?, 20. 
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to their cause was Ralph Nader’s Center for the Study of Responsive Law.35 The Lloyd Harbor 
Study Group was represented in the hearing by experienced lawyer Irving Like. Like’s 
experience allowed him to see that he (and the LHSG) would not succeed in stopping the 
construction permit from being issued to LILCO, so he adopted a particular strategy in the 
courtroom, using the hearings as “an educational forum to alert the public to the project’s 
adverse effect on environmental quality.”36 This strategy allowed Like and other LHSG 
witnesses to voice their variety of concerns including: the adequacy of AEC construction 
standards, environmental impacts of the plant under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), and public health concerns, including questions on how Long Island would be 
evacuated in the case of an emergency.37  
 As Irving Like expected, the AEC issued LILCO the construction permit for Shoreham 
mid-April 1973. The permit was approved with “six conditions” attached by the AEC in 
response to LHSG’s environmental concerns relating to radiation releases, thermal pollution, and 
protection of wetlands.38 These “six conditions” served as a consolation prize to the LHSG and 
Like; they could not stop the permit from being issued, but at least received something for their 
efforts. The Lloyd Harbor Study Group’s role in the construction permit hearings had a lasting 
effect on the destiny of the Shoreham plant, not simply because they delayed the plant for over 
two years. The Lloyd Harbor Study Group’s contribution was that they brought to light some of 
the major public health and environmental implications surrounding the Shoreham nuclear plant. 
A particular problem brought to public attention by the Lloyd Harbor Study Group was the 
                                                          
35 Howard Schneider, “New Twists for Atomic-Plant Hearing,” Newsday, September 24, 1970, pg. 26. 
36 Aron, Licensed to Kill?, 21-2. 
37 Ibid, 24-6. 
38 David A. Andelman, “A.E.C. Approves L.I. Atom Plant: Building of Power Facility at Shoreham is Allowed,” 
The New York Times, April 13, 1973, pg. 44. 
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possibility of evacuating Long Island in the event of a nuclear disaster, a concern that would 
trouble many Long Islanders after Three Mile Island and would push Shoreham closer to closure. 
Further Complications at Shoreham 
 
Riding the wave of victory following the issuing of the construction permit at Shoreham, 
LILCO announced a new nuclear project for Jamesport in Suffolk County. By July 1973, LILCO 
announced a $600-million dollar, 1150 megawatt plant for Jamesport.39 After the AEC 
construction permit hearings—and the concerns brought up by LHSG— anti-LILCO and anti-
nuclear opposition grew. As a result of this opposition even elected officials began to separate 
themselves from LILCO, Shoreham and any other nuclear plants planned for Long Island.40 By 
1977, Suffolk County hired Irving Like to be the county’s voice against the plant at Jamesport.41 
One concern about the Jamesport plant that Like raised was “whether these plants [Shoreham 
and Jamesport] are needed.”42 Like and the County claimed the plants were unnecessary, where 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (born in 1974 from the AEC) and LILCO agreed that the 
electricity to be created at Jamesport was needed to keep up with Long Island’s power 
demands.43 Eventually in 1980, New York State had the final say on whether the plant at 
Jamesport was needed, and turned down all of LILCO’s applications for Jamesport based on 
economic grounds and post-Three Mile Island nuclear fear.44 LILCO’s plans for Jamesport had 
lasting effects on the Shoreham saga, even though no plant was actually built in Jamesport. 
According to Joan Aron, LILCO’s ambitions for Jamesport radicalized “a lot of people on Long 
                                                          
39 Tom Incantalupo, “Another A-Plant Battle Takes Shape,” Newsday, July 25, 1973, pg. 19. 
40 Aron, Licensed to Kill?, 30. 
41 Ibid, 37. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, 38 
44 Ibid. 
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Island … over a plant that was really not needed.”45 This radicalization of Long Islanders against 
the Jamesport plant lingered, furthering distrust of LILCO and opposition to Shoreham. 
 Long Islanders’ trust of LILCO was not only degraded by LILCO’s plans for Jamesport, 
but by LILCO’s economic practices. By the end of the 1970s, the price of their prized project at 
Shoreham ballooned, and the company sank into debt. By 1980 LILCO was over $1.3 billion 
dollars in debt.46 LILCO’s debt did not pile up overnight, but was accumulated over the years 
due to construction related costs. After the construction permit was approved and ground was 
broken at Shoreham, the economic problems began to arise. The AEC (later NRC) regulations 
for piping and wiring were frequently changed, and as a result were often violated at 
Shoreham.47 In 1974 the NRC found a wiring violation in regards to minimal electrical cable 
spacing. To fix the violation, the existing cables had to be removed and reinstalled—additional 
costs that had to come from LILCO’s pocket. The construction of Shoreham was riddled with 
these kinds of violations that required reinstallation or reconstruction, and as a result construction 
costs grew.48 In addition to dealing with NRC violations at Shoreham, LILCO also faced the 
labor issues associated with the construction industry such as inefficient workers. A Public 
Service Commission audit of Shoreham in 1978 found that construction workers at the plant 
were on average only working for 1.5 hours of a 7 hour work day due to corruption in the 
construction unions.49 As the costs associated with constructing the Shoreham plant grew, the 
projected cost dramatically increased from $65 million to $2.2 billion between 1966 and 1980.50 
To add insult to injury, by the mid-1970s Long Islanders’ electricity consumption had decreased, 
                                                          
45 Aron, Licensed to Kill?, 38. 
46 Ibid, 41. 
47 Ibid, 32. 
48 Ibid, 31. 
49 Ibid, 34. 
50 Ibid, 41. 
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contrary to LILCO’s predictions of a 40% increase over five years.51 With increased spending, 
and an income lower than expected due to energy conservation, LILCO resorted to charging 
customers more for their electricity.52 When Long Islanders complained about the cost of 
electricity or requested the abandonment of the Shoreham project to save LILCO money, the 
utility responded with threats of blackouts or even higher electrical costs.53 Rising costs, delays, 
and threats associated with the construction of Shoreham expanded the rift between LILCO and 
Long Islanders. At the same time as the plant at Shoreham was being built, across the sound a 
nuclear power plant in Waterford, Connecticut was also being build. Waterford’s plant had a 
vastly different history during its construction, avoiding much of the opposition experienced at 
Shoreham.   
Millstone 1965-1979 
 
On April 29th 1965, the headline read: “$70 Million Plant Called ‘Best Thing Since 1801.” 
The headline in other words stated that the new nuclear power plant announced for Waterford, 
Connecticut was thought to be the best thing since the town became incorporated in 1801.54 The 
Millstone Point plant was a joint project of Connecticut Light and Power Company and Western 
Massachusetts Electric Company. Millstone was set to produce around 600,000 kilowatts of 
electricity, and be operational by around 1969.55 In May of 1965, a survey reinforced this 
positive view of the power plant. The survey showed that citizens of four New England towns 
where nuclear plants were proposed, including Waterford, cared more about the tax breaks the 
                                                          
51 Aron, Licensed to Kill?, 37. 
52 Ibid, 41. 
53 Ibid, 42. 
54 “$70 Million Plant Called 'Best Thing Since 1801',” The Hartford Courant, April 29, 1965, pg. 19D. 
55 “3 Utilities Plan Big Atomic Plant: $70 Million Station Will Be Built in Connecticut,” The New York Times, April 
29, 1965, pg. 24. 
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plants would bring than environmental concerns and the conservation of the area’s natural 
beauty.56 That is not to say that there was not a portion of the population who opposed the plant 
based on environmental concerns, but the majority was in favor of it for economic reasons 
according to the New York Times.57 With minimal delays, Millstone Point was licensed, built and 
began commercial operation by the end of December 1970. Earlier that December, the process of 
obtaining a second generating unit at Millstone began.  
On May 4th 1972, the Long Island Sound experienced a major case of nuclear power plant 
induced environmental degradation. On that spring day less than two years after the plant began 
operating, over 10,000 menhaden fish were found dead near Waterford. Scientists concluded the 
cause of this mass fish kill was thermal pollution caused by the Millstone power plant. The 
scientists reached this conclusion by measuring the temperature of the water surrounding the 
nuclear plant, finding the water surrounding Millstone over 22 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than 
the seasonal average. The 22 degree difference was enough to send the fish into thermal shock.58 
The thermal pollution problem and the subsequent fish kills would be generally overlooked by 
the residents of Waterford due to the economic benefit of the plant (reduced real estate taxes) and 
the fact that the fish kills did not directly affect most of the residents in one way or another.59 
Thermal pollution would continue to be a nagging problem from Millstone Point’s various 
                                                          
56 John C. Devlin, “Atom Generators Gaining Approval: Tax Windfalls Sap Protest of Conservationists,” The New 
York Times, May 9, 1965, pg. 59. 
57 Ibid. 
58 “Fish Kill in L.I. Sound Laid to Power-Plant Discharge,” The New York Times, May 5, 1972, pg.11. 
59 Marilyn E. Weigold, The Long Island Sound: A History of its People, Places and Environment. (New York: New 
York University Press, 2004) pg. 184. 
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reactors, with debates still raging today on what should be done to the plant to reduce its effect 
on the Sound’s ecosystem.60 
 In a ditch 1000 yards away from the Millstone reactor were the smoldering remains of a 
small airplane. About four months after the aforementioned fish kill, on August 25th 1972, the 
plane carrying two passengers hit a 27,000 volt wire a short distance from the reactor. Both 
passengers survived, and the damage was quickly repaired, but the incident exposed the 
vulnerability of the nuclear plant to the unexpected. Much like with the fish kills a few months 
earlier, the incident was overlooked and soon forgotten by the residents of Waterford.61  
A major fish kill and a plane crash apparently could not catch Waterford residents’ attention 
and ignite fear, but a radioactive water spill at Millstone in 1975 did. On March 28th 1,200 
workers were evacuated from Millstone 1 and 2, which was at the time under control of 
Northeastern Utilities. An “abnormal occurrence” caused contaminated water to overflow the 
system. This water was then pumped straight into the Long Island Sound.62 The contaminated 
water was discharged legally into the Sound, with acceptable levels of radiation considered by 
the AEC not to be harmful to the environment. According to Herbert Davis, Waterford’s First 
Selectman, a resident contacted the Town stating that “this whole thing has got a lot of residents 
here scared.”63 It took this minor radiation leak in 1975 to sow seeds of doubt in the minds of 
                                                          
60 Gregory B. Hladky, “Are Millstone’s Nuclear Plants Adding to the Sound’s Warming Problems?” The Hartford 
Courant, June 22, 2015, http://www.courant.com/politics/hcmillstone-hot-water-20150622-story.html.  
61 “Radioactive Water Spill at Plant Alarms Residents in Connecticut,” The New York Times, March 29, 1975, pg. 
22. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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residents of Waterford. Expansion continued at Millstone, however, and by the end of 1975 a 
second reactor, Unit 2, was in operation.64  
Even with the events of the recent radiation leak fresh in the minds of residents, a poll 
conducted by the Oak Ridge Tennessee National Laboratory in 1975-76 found that a staggering 
94% of residents in Waterford would “vote in favor of building [Millstone] if they had to do it 
over.”65  The results of this survey showed the highest percentage of acceptance of nuclear power 
of any surveyed community in the nation.66 The poll reinforced Herbert Davis’s 1973 sentiment 
that “Waterford is riding around in a Cadillac instead of a Chevy because of the plant” due to the 
significant economic benefits of the plant.67 This highly positive view of Millstone would be 
tested in 1979 after the events at Three Mile Island.  After Three Mile Island, questions were 
raised regarding the logistics of evacuating Waterford and the surrounding cities in the event of a 
Three Mile Island-like nuclear incident. 
Three Mile Island - 1979  
Fear of “China Syndrome” 
 
On March 28th, 1979 the United States’ worst nuclear accident unfolded at Three Mile 
Island Nuclear Generating Station near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The disaster was caused by a 
stuck valve and was worsened by electrical and human errors, causing a partial meltdown at 
Three Mile Island.68 As the plant was melting down, two concerns plagued those in the control 
                                                          
64 “Millstone Power Station,” Dominion, accessed March 27, 2016, https://www.dom.com/corporate/what-we-
do/electricity/generation/nuclear/millstone-power-station.  
65 “Neighbors Said to Like A Nuclear Power Plant,” The New York Times, July 9, 1976, pg. 16. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Michael Knight, “Connecticut Town Discovers Its Nuclear Power Plant is a Mixed Blessing,” The New York 
Times, May 22, 1973, pg. 43. 
68 James Mahaffey, Atomic Accidents: A History of Nuclear Meltdowns and Disasters: From the Ozark Mountains 
to Fukushima (Cambridge: Pegasus, 2015) pg. 339. 
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room of the plant. The first concern was of the molten uranium-oxide fuel dripping and melting 
through the containment vessel because the fuel was not being cooled. The second concern was 
the build-up of a hydrogen gas bubble in the reactor. The presence of the hydrogen bubble posed 
two threats: the pressure of the hydrogen bubble against the containment vessel causing the 
vessel to break, and the bubble igniting and exploding. Both of these concerns would have likely 
caused a plume of radiation to be spread up to 10 miles downwind.69 As the media covered the 
disaster, the concerns of those in the control room soon became the concerns of those near the 
plant. Luckily for the sake of everyone near the plant, neither of these outcomes unfolded and the 
reactor reached cold shutdown on April 7th 1979.70 According to nuclear engineer Dr. James 
Mahaffey, Three Mile Island became the “worst industrial disaster in which not one person was 
harmed,” but still resulted in major changes in the planning of nuclear energy, and had lasting 
impacts on the public’s view of nuclear energy and shook confidence in atomic technology.71 
 An unlikely coincidence, paired with media coverage brought the events of Three Mile 
Island to the eyes and ears of countless Americans. Just 12 days before the disaster at TMI, on 
March 16, 1979, The China Syndrome hit theaters across the country.72 Starring Jane Fonda and 
Michael Douglas, The China Syndrome was a fictional and prophetic tale that spoke to the 
dangers of nuclear energy. The title of the movie refers to a line in the movie where a scientist 
explains that if a plant was to have a meltdown, the core would theoretically melt through the 
earth, all the way to China, thus the China Syndrome. Even though in reality the molten fuel core 
would not continue to melt through the earth to China as the film’s scientist suggested, the movie 
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became a popular tool for members of the media to help the citizens of the nation understand the 
events at Three Mile Island.73 With the threat of a full blown China Syndrome looming over 
Pennsylvania, Americans across the country began to worry. This fear was focused around one 
major issue that would become relevant to both the histories of the plants at Shoreham and 
Millstone: evacuation.  
Upon hearing about the risk of a “hydrogen bomb” or possible explosion of the hydrogen 
bubble in the reactor at Three Mile Island on Friday March 30th, 42,000 residents were evacuated 
from around the power plant.74 On that same Friday, Pennsylvania governor Dick Thornburgh 
called for the evacuation of pregnant women and children.75 By Sunday, 135,000 people, or 20% 
of the population located within 20 miles of the plant had evacuated the area.76 Between the mass 
of panicked residents voluntarily fleeing the immediate area, and the call for evacuation of a 
select portion of the population by the state government, it is not surprising that the concept of 
evacuating around a nuclear accident was brought to national attention. As a result of TMI, the 
NRC “encouraged the development and implementation of emergency response plans and 
preparedness measures.”77 The national attention brought to emergency response and 
preparedness at nuclear plants affected both Millstone and Shoreham. Officials at LILCO “did 
not expect the accident at Three Mile Island to greatly affect their operations.”78 When it was 
later deemed that evacuating Long Island would be nearly impossible due to its geography, 
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LILCO’s assumption that Three Mile Island would not affect their Shoreham project would 
prove dead wrong.79  
Post Three Mile Island  
Shoreham (1979-1982) 
 
Even in the wake of Three Mile Island, LILCO and other New York utilities remained 
steadfast in their pursuit of nuclear power. The New York State Power Pool made up of New 
York’s electric suppliers, including LILCO, released a report in April 1979 which suggested that 
more nuclear plants should be constructed in New York in the coming years. The basis of the 
Power Pool’s argument for nuclear was “in view of sharp increases in the price of imported oil,” 
and that “nuclear power can generate power safely.”80 This report was drafted before the events 
of Three Mile Island, and yet the Power Pool still decided to publish it after the accident. It is up 
for interpretation whether the demand for more plants in the report was an economic play by the 
utility, or based on the utility’s genuine concern over the future of New York’s energy. 
Regardless of the utility’s reason for publishing the report, the call for new plants can be seen as 
a disconnect between LILCO and the concerned population of Long Island. 
Upon hearing news of the accident at Three Mile Island, a sense of panic filled some 
residents of Long Island. Some of these concerned residents even went as far as to call LILCO to 
make sure the not-yet-complete plant at Shoreham was not the plant melting down, or at risk of 
melting down.81 This seemingly impossible mistake—thinking that the plant at Three Mile Island 
was synonymous with Shoreham—can likely be credited to the emotional response these 
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residents had after hearing of the accident in Pennsylvania.  Building on the uneasy atmosphere 
brought on by the accident at Three Mile Island, concerns regarding evacuation of Long Island in 
the event of an accident at Shoreham were once again expressed by Long Island residents. These 
were the same concerns regarding evacuation were initially voiced by Irving Like and the Lloyd 
Harbor Study Group during Shoreham’s construction permit hearings earlier in the decade. 
The argument regarding evacuation of Long Island in the event of an incident at Shoreham had 
two sides. One side, in support of the plant, saw evacuation of Long Island as difficult but not 
impossible, while opponents to the plant saw the task of evacuation as impossible. Tomas 
Twomey, a lawyer for the Long Island Farm Bureau, who was in opposition to Shoreham was 
quoted in the The New York Times as saying: “Evacuation of the areas around Shoreham… 
would be virtually impossible because we are on an island, and the only routes of escape would 
be through tunnels and bridges to the mainland… The roads would be so clogged with panicky 
drivers that it would be a disaster.”82 Much of Long Island shared a viewpoint similar to 
Twomey’s. “You Can’t Evacuate Long Island” became many resident’s battle cry.83 
 By 1979, LILCO and Suffolk County had what seemed to be a finalized evacuation plan. 
With the election of a new county executive, and with focus placed on evacuation planning, 
Suffolk County retracted the initial evacuation plan for Shoreham, and began drafting a second 
evacuation plan in 1981 which would cost LILCO $245,000.84 LILCO’s original plan and 
Suffolk’s new plan were vastly different. LILCO’s plan was “simple and straightforward” and 
assumed evacuation would be an “orderly process.”85 Suffolk’s plan provided a contrary opinion, 
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a “detailed, elaborate, and pessimistic” plan that was based on risk assessments and detailed 
analysis of many possible types of accidents that could strike Shoreham.86 The Suffolk Plan 
conservatively estimated that the emergency planning zone (EPZ), which was twice as large in 
the Suffolk Plan as it was in the LILCO Plan, would take fourteen to thirty hours to evacuate in 
the event of an emergency. The county also collected data through surveys to see how residents 
would react in the event of an emergency. Unsurprisingly, a county-sponsored survey of 
residents indicated that there would be a “shadow evacuation,” where residents outside of the 
EPZ to the west would unnecessarily evacuate, causing traffic that would delay evacuation of 
those closest to the accident on the east end of Long Island.87 In addition, it was found in a 
survey of emergency service personnel, that ambulance drivers and volunteer firemen would also 
evacuate the area, ignoring their role in the emergency plan, causing a so-called “role conflict.”88  
Armed with data indicating “role conflicts” and “shadow evacuations,” the county executive 
submitted the Suffolk Plan to the county legislature in 1982. Convinced by the plan that 
evacuation of Long Island was “unacceptable” and “impossible,” the legislature voted to 
“terminate all emergency planning efforts and requested that the NRC forgo any further licensing 
action for Shoreham.”89 Shoreham’s Achilles heel was exposed. Evacuation became the single 
most relevant topic of debate that would determine the plant’s future.90 
Millstone (1979-1986) 
 
On May 20, 1980, retired head of Park City Hospital’s department of radiology, Dr. Isaac 
Horowitz wrote an article for the Hartford Courant to try to calm the hysteria caused by Three 
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Mile Island. In his article, Dr. Horowitz cited how minimal the amount of radiation released 
around Three Mile Island was. The doctor then made the comparison that the amount of radiation 
received by those around Three Mile Island was equal to the amount of radiation received by a 
person on vacation for six days in a Colorado ski resort.91 Dr. Horowitz continued writing that 
the long term effects of Three Mile Island’s radiation would be negligible. Dr. Horowitz stated 
that 90% of a sample Nagasaki and Hiroshima survivors showed “no measurable statistical 
effects” as a result of the excessive amount of radiation they received following the detonations 
of atomic weaponry.92 By telling readers that 90% of Nagasaki and Hiroshima survivors were 
found to be unaffected by the radiation released after 30 years of study and large population 
samples, Dr. Horowitz is making the claim that the radiation released from commercial nuclear 
plants is nothing to be worried about.93 Using the aforementioned examples, amongst others 
(including the birth rates of “mongoloid” children in Japan following World War II), Dr. 
Horowitz argued that “Nuclear is safer, healthier and cheaper than any other source of energy” 
available in 1980.94 It appeared that much of Connecticut shared Dr. Horowitz’s pro-nuclear 
sentiments in the wake of Three Mile Island, and as a result did not voice their concerns 
regarding evacuation nearly as loudly as their neighbors across the Sound on Long Island. 
Following Three Mile Island, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission demanded nuclear 
plants to take second looks at their evacuation plans, and Millstone Power Station was no 
exception. Evacuating the residents of Connecticut from around Millstone was not the seemingly 
impossible task that planning to evacuate Long Island was. Millstone, being in southern 
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Connecticut, could be evacuated to the north, east and west. The question of how the evacuation 
plan would function was not the issue; where to find the money to pay for the evacuation plan 
became the issue. Debates raged over whether the plan should be funded with Waterford’s 
Millstone tax money, or funded some other way.95  It was estimated by Waterford’s First 
Selectman Lawrence Bettencourt that funding the evacuation plan using Millstone taxes would 
take more than $2.5 million from Waterford, an option unpopular with Waterford residents.96 
Eventually an agreement was reached and the evacuation plan was adopted. In comparison to 
Shoreham, the process of creating and implementing an evacuation plan for Millstone was 
straightforward. Looking at newspaper coverage following Three Mile Island, the biggest 
concern for the residents of Connecticut did not appear to be if they could evacuate, but how they 
would pay for the evacuation plan. Compared to Shoreham, Millstone escaped the wake of Three 
Mile Island unscathed, with minimal effect on day to day operation. Millstone following Three 
Mile Island could be seen as an example of the lingering pro-nuclear mindset for the decade. A 
national poll by Louis Harris and Associates following the events of Three Mile Island found 
that “opposition to nuclear power had increased since Three Mile Island, but the public still 
favors its development.”97 In addition to the majority of the public favoring nuclear 
development, the federal government also continued to strongly encourage the growth of the 
nuclear industry. President Carter continued to publicly support nuclear power following Three 
Mile Island, and the House of Representatives defeated a proposed six-month moratorium of new 
nuclear growth following Three Mile Island.98 This pro-nuclear push by the federal government 
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foreshadows the battle that would ensue to determine the final fate of Shoreham – a battle pitting 
the state of New York, led by Mario Cuomo against the NRC. 
The Plants Today 
Final Fate of Shoreham (1983-1994) 
 
With concerns regarding evacuation in The New York Times headlines, it was only a 
matter of time before the State of New York joined in the conversation regarding nuclear energy. 
In 1983, Mario Cuomo became governor of New York, and almost immediately opposed the 
federal government’s pro-nuclear agenda.99 Governor Cuomo appointed a fact-finding 
commission, led by Dr. John H. Marburger, physicist and president of SUNY Stony Brook in the 
same year, 1983. The Marburger Commission, as it would be called, was made up of twelve 
experts in multiple fields relating to the nuclear energy business, including but not limited to, 
nuclear technology, public health, economics, regulation and suburban studies. Of the twelve 
members, three were known proponents of the plant, three were known opponents of the plant, 
and the remaining six were neutral, neither vocally for nor against the plant.100 The goal of the 
Marburger Commission was to advise and guide Governor Cuomo, and by extension New York 
State’s actions relating to Shoreham.101 The members of the Marburger Commission struggled to 
agree on many points, but did conclude that abandoning the almost completed Shoreham (about 
99% finished at the time) would not cost more money than operating it.102 The Marburger 
Commission also concluded that the plant at Shoreham would have been “unacceptable” by 
1980s standards based on LILCO’s location selection alone.103 Armed with the Marburger 
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Commission’s suggestions, and poll information showing that 52% of residents wished that the 
plant at Shoreham would not be completed, Governor Cuomo took action against the NRC and 
LILCO.104 
The role of opposing Shoreham slipped out of the hands of small grassroots organizations 
like Lloyd Harbor Study Group and the general public, into the hands of local and state 
governments. When the hearings for Shoreham’s operating license (a similar process to the 
aforementioned construction permit hearings) rolled around, LILCO was opposed by Suffolk 
County and the State of New York.105  The operating license hearings were in part political; the 
NRC believed that state and county governments should do their part to get Shoreham up and 
running, whether or not they supported or opposed the plant’s operation.106 Conversely, 
Governor Cuomo argued that if the state and county did not want the plant, they had the right to 
do their part to shut the plant down.107 After almost two years of fruitless hearings, the argument 
of whether to grant an operating license for Shoreham was heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit, and the court issued LILCO a low-power license for Shoreham in 1985.108 
This operating license allowed a nuclear chain reaction, less than 5% of the location’s total 
energy generation, to be started in Shoreham’s core. Starting this reaction officially contaminated 
the plant and tacked on an estimated half a billion dollars to cleanup and decommissioning fees if 
that was to be Shoreham’s fate. LILCO’s decision to perform low-level testing at Shoreham was 
a gamble. Some at LILCO believed that by testing at Shoreham and contaminating the site, there 
would be no option but to open the plant, and be issued a full operating license.109 Governor 
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Cuomo responded to the low-level testing by saying, “LILCO has for years been gambling with 
ratepayers’ money and losing. They are doing it again with this decision. One would hope they 
would learn from their mistakes.”110 Outraged by the low-level testing at Shoreham, Governor 
Cuomo was determined to shut Shoreham down. Before LILCO could be issued a full-power 
license, they would have to successfully perform an emergency evacuation drill of Shoreham and 
the area surrounding the plant. The drill would be supervised by FEMA, who would cast final 
judgment whether or not the drill was successful.111 In February 1986, the exercise was 
conducted and failed horribly. An NRC licensing board found “fundamental flaws” with 
LILCO’s showing, and the Shoreham emergency plan did not meet NRC standards.112  
Following the failed emergency plan and the incident at Chernobyl in the USSR, 
residents were finally fed up with LILCO by July 1986.113 A movement was growing to have the 
state legislature “create a public authority that would buy LILCO stock and transfer ownership of 
LILCO from current shareholders to a government entity.”114 This massive undertaking was 
supported by 70 percent of Long Island residents, Governor Cuomo, and both the State Senate 
and Assembly.115 The Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) was officially created to induce a 
public takeover of LILCO. Eventually LIPA acquired enough of LILCO stock to effectively 
control the company. Additionally, Governor Cuomo and LILCO reached an “agreement in 
principle” in 1988, where Shoreham would be sold to LIPA for $1.116 In return, LILCO would 
receive rate increases to elevate some of the economic burden brought about by Shoreham.117 
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LILCO and LIPA worked together to decommission the plant, beginning in 1989.118 The plant 
was fully decommissioned in 1994 following the thirty-third and final shipment of radioactive 
material to Pennsylvania to be used by the Philadelphia Electric Company.119 The costs incurred 
by LILCO, both through construction and attorney fees would be too much for the company to 
rebound from. The $6 billion nuclear plant at Shoreham drove LILCO to merge with Brooklyn 
Union Gas Company in 1996, leaving LIPA in charge of providing power to Long Island.120 
Residents today are still paying off Shoreham’s debt. As of 2009, an estimated $3.3 billion 
dollars of Shoreham’s cost remained to be paid through customer’s electric bills.121 
Today, the structure of the Shoreham power plant still stands, but on site activity is 
minimal. What to do with the abandoned structure was a topic of debate in the early 90s before 
the plant was fully decommissioned. Some ideas for the plant ranged from feasible to far-
fetched. One of the more tame suggestions for what to do with Shoreham was to construct a gas-
fired plant. Some of the more outlandish suggestions for the site were: the world’s largest 
incinerator, a reactor to produce tritium for nuclear warheads, or a high speed ferry linking 
Connecticut to Long Island (suggested by Governor Cuomo himself).122 Nothing came from the 
suggestions from the early 90s, and LIPA’s plant continued to lay vacant. LIPA continued to 
provide Long Island’s energy up until 2014 when Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) Long 
Island took on energy production, with LIPA overseeing PSEG’s performance as a service 
provider.123 There are currently debates surrounding the future of Shoreham, with the latest 
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proposal calling for the plant be used as a deep water port. A port is already on location, used to 
ferry in construction materials for the nuclear plant decades ago. Proponents of the port at 
Shoreham claim that it would reduce the number of trucks crossing Long Island, thus relieving 
congestion on the Island’s roadways, and reducing air pollution from truck exhaust. Opponents 
cite the estimated $1 million dollar cost to expand the port as a major downside to the proposed 
use.124 Only time will tell what the future of Shoreham will hold.  
Millstone (1986-Present) 
 
Even in the turbulence of the nuclear industry following the events of 1979, Millstone 
continued to grow. On April 23, 1986, coincidentally just three days before the disaster at 
Chernobyl, Millstone Unit 3 began commercial operation.125 The addition of Unit 3 would mark 
the peak of Millstone’s energy production. This short lived peak would end in 1995 when energy 
production at Millstone Unit 1 was stopped after allegations of unsafe work practices.126 By 1998 
all operations at Unit 1 were officially ceased and the process of decommissioning the plant 
began shortly after. Millstone Unit 1 had been in operation for 28 years by the time of its 
closure.127 As of 2007, the NRC stated in a report that the spent fuel from Millstone Unit 1 (that 
was removed in 1995) must stay in the spent fuel pool on site until it is safe to move again by 
2048. This leaves the tentative final closure date of Millstone Unit 1 at December 31, 2056.128 To 
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put this in perspective, these fuel rods from Millstone Unit 1 that were removed in 1995 will sit 
in a cooling pool for approximately twice as many years as the plant was in operation. Northeast 
Utilities, who oversaw Millstone for most of its life, sold the plant to Dominion Energy in early 
2001. Dominion still operates the plant today, including the continuing process of 
decommissioning Unit 1.129 The operating license for Unit 2 is set to expire in 2035.130 Similarly, 
Unit 3’s license will expire in 2045.131 Past these expiration dates, the future of Millstone’s 
energy production is uncertain.  
Today, Millstone has been at the center of environmental arguments surrounding thermal 
pollution and the rising temperatures of the Long Island Sound. Having seawater-cooled reactors 
at Millstone ties the plant closely to the Long Island Sound. Millstone is dependent on the Sound 
for water to cool the plant, and in return the ecology of the Sound is disrupted by the thermal 
pollution released from the plant, and the destruction of fish and other marine life by the pumps 
providing water to the plant to cool its core. Retrofitting the plant to have cooling towers would 
reduce the aforementioned environmental impacts to the Sound, but the costly retrofit would be 
an estimated $2.6 billion dollars.132 The decision whether to build cooling towers at Millstone 
has still not been decided as of early 2016. Environmentalists and scientists including faculty at 
Stony Brook University on Long Island, continue to fight for the addition of cooling towers at 
Millstone out of concern for the health of the Sound’s ecology.133  
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Conclusion 
The Future of Nuclear Energy? 
 
What do these tales of nuclear energy on the northern and southern shores of the Long 
Island Sound tell us? A conclusion that could be made after reading the histories of the nuclear 
power plants at Millstone and Shoreham is that picking a suitable community for a nuclear plant 
is key. Many factors go into finding a right “fit” for a technology, a few being: geographic 
location, the area’s economic situation, demographics, the era when it is being introduced, or 
simply the choice of the technology itself. In the case of nuclear technology on the Long Island 
Sound, enough of these factors led to a proverbial hit at Millstone, where Shoreham was an 
expensive miss. Does one “hit” at Millstone mean that nuclear energy is “good” and should be 
implemented everywhere possible? Conversely, does one “miss” at Shoreham mean that nuclear 
energy is “bad” and should be stopped at all costs? The goal of this discussion section is to offer 
an objective discussion on the sustainability of nuclear energy, and its future use to combat 
climate change. A conclusion whether or not nuclear energy is “good” or “bad” will not be made 
however, as conclusions of that subjectivity can be made by the individual.  
What is Sustainability? 
Today, one of the more widely accepted definitions of sustainability came from the 1987 
Brundtland Report, also known as Our Common Future. In the Brundtland report, sustainability 
is defined as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs.”134 The “needs” spoken about in the Brundtland 
report are social, environmental and economic needs. The needs of sustainability have been 
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pictured in a variety of metaphoric models, ranging from a three-legged stool to three columns 
supporting a roof. Regardless of the model being used to visualize it, if one of the needs is 
removed, the structure will fail. Often times, the one component of sustainability, the social, is 
overlooked for economic and environmental benefits—but as the aforementioned models show, 
all three components are equally important.    
One example of the contention between the three components of sustainability can be seen 
with something as simple as a compact fluorescent lightbulb (CFL). CFLs, prior to the 
proliferation of LED lightbulbs, were seen as the clear sustainable lightbulb option.  CFLs are 
affordable and use less energy than incandescent bulbs, but contain toxic materials. The CFLs 
are socially and economically appealing because of their perceived benefits, but fall short 
environmentally due to their toxic composition. Are CFLs more sustainable than their 
predecessor, the incandescent lightbulb? Yes. Are CFLs sustainable? Debatable. The point of the 
lightbulb example is to show that sustainability is not black and white and is ever-changing. With 
technological advancement, what is considered sustainable today, might not be considered 
sustainable in the future. Nuclear energy since its inception has been pitched as low cost and 
non-polluting: does that qualify nuclear energy as sustainable? The following section will lay out 
both the sustainable, and the not so sustainable aspects of nuclear energy. 
Sustainability and Nuclear Energy  
The Positives 
 
The promise of cheap and reliable energy was one of the greatest appeals of nuclear 
energy. In 1954, Lewis Strauss, then a commissioner of the AEC, pitched nuclear technology to 
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American citizens as energy that would be “too cheap to meter.”135 Nuclear plants, as seen with 
the Shoreham nuclear plant, require significant upfront costs to construct the plant, but future 
costs for fuel and upkeep are generally low. The opposite is generally found to be true with other 
more conventional sources of energy such as coal and gas powered plants, where initial cost is 
comparatively low, but long term costs for fuel are high and unpredictable due to the turbulence 
of the foreign fuel market.136 In the 1960s and 70s, nuclear plants began popping up across the 
country, but expansion halted in the late 70s largely because of the high up-front costs associated 
with the plants. As a result of the vigorous expansion and efficiency of nuclear power plants, 
roughly 20% of America’s electricity today is still generated using nuclear power plants built 
before the nuclear industry stagnated in the late 1970s.137 Nuclear energy can be considered 
economically sustainable by being a reliable and efficient use of resources that does not depend 
on imported fossil fuels. 
Cheap and reliable energy was not the only appealing factor of nuclear energy. Nuclear, 
being considered a “clean” source of energy, appealed to Americans as a way to combat air 
pollution that resulted from the burning of fossil fuels.138 As was seen shortly after Shoreham’s 
announcement in the early 1960s, there was a commonly held view that the future of energy was 
a choice between “soot or atoms.”139 In the 60 and 70s, concerns regarding air pollution focused 
on sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide and particulate matter that resulted from 
burning coal.140 To many Americans, including President Barack Obama, concerns over air 
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pollution from fossil fuel based energy production revolve around carbon emissions, which are 
closely tied to concerns surrounding global climate change.141 An environmental benefit of 
nuclear energy production is its lack of gaseous pollution, be it carbon dioxide or particulate. 
Because of the lack of gaseous pollution produced, nuclear energy can be considered 
environmentally sustainable in addition to being considered economically sustainable. 
The Negatives 
 
 In the prior section, nuclear energy was considered an environmentally sustainable source 
of power because of its lack of carbon emissions. Contrary to that point, nuclear can also be 
viewed as one of the most environmentally unsustainable means of energy production for two 
reasons: thermal pollution and radioactive waste. Thermal pollution from nuclear power plants 
occurs when high temperature water used to cool a reactor is dumped into a body of water, be it 
an ocean, lake, or river. The localized rise in water temperature can cause direct ecological 
disruption by causing organisms like plants and fish to die, or indirect disruption to the 
ecosystem though algal blooms, which wreak havoc on the ecosystem’s oxygen levels.142 The 
effects of thermal pollution from nuclear power plants can be offset by the construction and 
utilization of cooling towers, but many plants in the United States including Millstone lack 
cooling towers. 
 The problem of dealing with radioactive waste from nuclear power plants does not have 
an easy fix, like adding a cooling tower to reduce thermal pollution. According to the NRC, the 
                                                          
141 “Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Announces Actions to Ensure that Nuclear Energy Remains a Vibrant 
Component of the United States’ Clean Energy Strategy,” The White House, November 6, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/06/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announces-actions-
ensure-nuclear-energy.  
142 Samuel J. Walker “Nuclear Power and the Environment: The Atomic Energy Commission and Thermal 
Pollution, 1965-1971,” Technology and Culture Vol. 30 no.4 (1989): 964–92.   
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process for dealing with radioactive waste is to first cool it by submerging it in pools of water on 
the site of the power plant, and then after “several years,” transfer the waste to dry cask 
storage.143 “Several years” according to the NRC is anywhere from 5-10 years, but some cases 
like Millstone, require around 50 years in the cooling pools.144 The “dry casks” the spent rods are 
stored in are “typically steel cylinders that are either welded or bolted closed. Each cylinder is 
surrounded by additional steel, concrete, or other material to provide radiation shielding to 
workers and members of the public.”145 The dry casks are then surrounded by additional steel, 
concrete or “other material” –a storage method that the NRC believes to “provide adequate 
protection of the public health and safety and the environment.”146 How is it that a steel and 
concrete structure can survive 10,000 to 100,000 years, the amount of time the spent fuel rods 
remain radioactive and pose a threat to human and environmental health?147 Unfortunately, the 
method of dry storage in steel and concrete is the best response humanity has yet to come up 
with to the monumental task of storing nuclear waste.148 Is having containers of radioactive 
material on site of the nuclear plant or buried underground really the most environmentally 
sustainable way to reduce the threat of global climate change? Is it more environmentally 
sustainable to reduce carbon emissions now, and deal with the nuclear waste later? These 
questions have no clear answers, and are further muddled when points like national security are 
added into the discussion.  
                                                          
143 “Spent Fuel Storage in Pools and Dry Casks Key Points and Questions & Answers,” United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, April 13, 2015, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/faqs.html.  
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 James Flynn et al., One Hundred Centuries of Solitude: Redirecting America’s High-Level Nuclear Waste Policy 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) pg. 20 
148 Ibid, x.  
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 Nuclear energy does not automatically mean a disregard for the social aspect of 
sustainability. With that said, nuclear energy does often fall short when it comes to the social 
aspect of sustainability. Finding a fit for a nuclear plant in a community is key for social 
sustainability. If a community is accepting of a nuclear plant, and offers sufficient economic 
compensation and peace of mind, like at Millstone, then it can be considered socially sustainable. 
If an electric utility or governmental agency pushes for nuclear energy in a community, like at 
Shoreham, and the community does not want the plant and/or fears it, then it is not socially 
sustainable. Even though nuclear is for the most part safe and accidents rare, there is a difficulty 
breaking the relation between “nuclear energy” and “Three Mile Island”, “Chernobyl”, or 
recently “Fukushima.” Overall, it is difficult to categorize nuclear energy as sustainable or not. 
Nuclear energy can be considered economically, environmentally and socially sustainable, thus 
fulfilling the Brundtland report’s three part definition of sustainability. At the same time, it can 
be argued that nuclear energy is not in any way sustainable.  
Closing Words 
 
Throughout the histories of Shoreham and Millstone, environmental, socio-political and 
economic factors shaped the outcomes of the two nuclear plants. With a beneficial economic 
situation and a willing community relaxed towards environmental concern, the Millstone Nuclear 
Power Station thrived, becoming an example of a successful American nuclear plant. A different 
story unfolded in Shoreham across the Long Island Sound. Environmental concern ignited a 
social resistance to LILCO and its nuclear plant at Shoreham. Economic instability soon 
followed because of LILCO’s mismanagement. As the story of Shoreham unfolded, the 
resistance to the plant and LILCO snowballed out of control, resulting in its closure. The $6 
billion plant lurks, vacant, its future still uncertain.   
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